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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads with reference to their 
ability to convey timely signals on the default risk of European sovereign countries and their banking 
systems. For a sample including six major European economies, we find that sovereign and bank CDS 
spreads are cointegrated variables at the country level. We then perform a more in-depth investigation of 
the underlying price discovery mechanisms, and find that both variables have an important price 
discovery role in the period preceding the financial crisis of 2007-2009. However, during the global 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign CDS spreads dominate the 
price discovery process. Our findings strongly suggest that, especially during crisis periods, sovereign 
CDS spreads incorporate more timely information on the default probability of European banks than their 
corresponding bank CDS spreads. Price discovery measures based on CDS prices could be used as market 
triggers to increase equity levels at financial institutions and in the various forms of contingent capital.  
 
JEL classification: G01; G12; G14; G20; D8 
Keywords: Credit default swap spreads; price discovery; information flow; financial crisis; banks; 
sovereign risk; bank capital; contingent capital 
 
 
* We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Science Foundation Ireland (08/SRC/FMC1389). We also want 
to thank Ajai Chopra and the participants of the Bank Resolution Mechanisms Conference for their useful comments 
and suggestions. E-mail addresses: davide.avino@ucd.ie (D. Avino), john.cotter@ucd.ie (J. Cotter).  
a Department of Banking and Finance, Smurfit Graduate School of Business, University College Dublin, Carysfort 
Avenue, Blackrock, Dublin, Ireland. 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The study of the interlinkages between sovereigns and banking systems has drawn great attention since 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis in mid-2007. Acharya et al. (2011) describe a two-way feedback 
effect between sovereign risk and banking risk, where bank bailouts by governments produce a negative 
effect on the sovereign’s public finances which, in turn, reduce the value of the implicit government 
guarantees for bank debt. This process generates a strong co-movement between the CDS spreads of 
sovereign countries and financial companies. Kallestrup et al. (2012) also show that the size of the 
implicit guarantees that the sovereign may extend to the domestic banking system has a strong effect on 
sovereign CDS spreads. Gerlach et al. (2010) indicate that the size of the banking sector is an important 
determinant of European sovereign risk spreads. Sgherri and Zoli (2009) find that solvency concerns of 
the national banking systems have become an important determinant of sovereign credit spreads during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
However, as the main findings of this paper confirm, the interconnectedness of banks and sovereigns has 
existed since before the start of the sub-prime crisis, and the successive European sovereign debt crisis. 
Since their introduction in 1988, Basel rules on banks’ capital requirements have certainly favoured the 
development of these links, which, in the past 5 years, have appeared to be particularly strong. According 
to the first Basel accord (Basel I), government bonds are given a zero risk weight. Basel II rules, 
introduced in 2004 to remediate some of the pitfalls existing in the previous accord (in particular the poor 
risk sensitivity for a bank’s capital allocation decisions), rely upon a ratings-based system (the 
standardised approach).
1
 According to this latter approach, AAA-rated and AA-rated government debt are 
assigned a zero risk weight. Furthermore, relative to the computation of the risk weight for banks’ 
exposures, a bank is given the option to classify its loans based on the rating assigned to the borrowing 
bank and the rating of the country where the borrowing bank operates (Resti and Sironi, 2007).  
Hence, based on the existing capital adequacy rules, government debt represents a cheap way for a bank 
to get a financial instrument which can be widely used for risk and liquidity management purposes. In 
particular, government bonds can be used as collateral for interbank loans, for repo transactions and to 
access central bank liquidity through the discount window. According to Bolton and Jeanne (2011), data 
on the 2010 European banks stress test show that, as of March 2010, on average, about 30% of 
government debt was held by the banking sector. Higher shares (of about 50%) were observed for Spain 
                                                          
1
 Basel II rules allow banks to choose among two main methods for computing capital requirements for credit risk. 
The first one is the standardised approach, which is based on credit ratings provided by external rating agencies. The 
second one is the internal ratings based (IRB) approach, which allows banks the use of their internal estimates of the 
loss given default, expected and unexpected losses to calculate the capital required for a given exposure (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005).    
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and Germany. Given the above evidence, it is then not surprising that a shock to a country’s banking 
system may have sizeable effects on its sovereign (and vice versa).  
In order to describe the linkages between European sovereigns and their respective banking systems, we 
focus on sovereign and bank CDS spreads for six major European economies during the period 2004-
2013. The objective of this paper is the study of the credit risk price discovery process implied by bank 
and sovereign CDS spreads. As the CDS spreads are cointegrated variables, they share the same 
stochastic trend (or common factor). We find that, while both bank and sovereign CDS spreads contribute 
to the price discovery of this common factor in the period preceding the financial crisis, sovereign CDS 
spreads lead the price discovery during the sub-prime crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. 
The study of these interconnections also allows us to investigate whether the price discovery implied by 
market CDS prices could have given timely signals about the financial risks of the European banking 
systems, which have subsequently become the main subject of costly resolution mechanisms and 
endangered the solvency of various European sovereigns. The recent examples of sovereign-funded bank 
bailout packages adopted by a group of European Union countries have shown how governments’ 
attempts at restructuring their countries’ banking system have generated huge costs for the taxpayers, 
which in turn have exacerbated recessionary spirals across European economies. 
Our results show that sovereign CDS spreads contain important credit risk information on a country’s 
banking system. This is especially true during recent crisis periods, whereby an investor would have 
obtained a more timely indication of a bank’s default risk from the CDS spreads of the sovereign country 
(where the bank operates) than the bank CDS spread itself. While the latter result can be explained, in 
part, by the extensive programmes of bank bailouts undertaken by European governments that have 
shifted the credit risk from the banking sector to the sovereigns, it is notable that sovereign CDS spreads 
lead the price discovery in France, Italy and Spain during the relatively stable period of 2004-2007, which 
certainly did not involve any bank bailout or financial transfer from governments to banks. 
Based on the cointegration between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, price discovery triggers for bank 
resolution mechanisms could be used in the future to raise banks’ equity buffers and their contingent 
capital. In retrospect, our findings show that, at the end of 2009, these triggers would have suggested the 
need for capital buffers for most European banks. As documented by Hart and Zingales (2011), CDS 
spreads capture the downside risk better than equity prices (which are subject to limited liability), are 
more liquid than bond issues and lead the price discovery process.  
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Our findings also contribute to the recent debate on the negative effect that speculation can have on the 
sovereign CDS market and the regulators’ decisions in 2010 to ban naked CDS trading. Indeed, our 
results show that the information flow and the price discovery of sovereign CDS markets, for a set of 
countries concerned by these restrictive policy decisions, are not negatively affected, as confirmed by the 
leading role of the sovereign CDS market documented for that period for all countries but Portugal. 
Our conclusions are important for bank regulators. Information about the credit risk of a country’s 
banking sector can be retrieved by analysing the sovereign credit risk. The latter could provide extra 
information that can be used by bank supervisors to improve banking rules on capital requirements. The 
early signals of a banking crisis could be obtained by observing sovereign credit spreads and this 
information could be used to take more timely policy actions in order to prevent a country-specific 
banking crisis from becoming systemic and affecting the whole European banking sector. In particular, 
the early signals implied by the price discovery process of bank and sovereign CDS spreads could be used 
as timely market triggers for a more efficient and effective implementation of resolution mechanisms for 
banks. Our findings also suggest that policymakers should adopt coordinated actions, especially in crisis 
periods when European banking sectors are similarly affected by negative shocks. With regard to that, 
recent proposals for the establishment of a banking union (Goyal et al., 2013) could help speed up the 
decision process at times when timely decisions are much needed. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the literature on the determinants of 
sovereign and bank credit spreads, the price discovery of credit spreads and the various proposals of 
contingent capital for banks. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the methodology. Section 
5 analyses the main results of our study and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related work    
Recent studies on the determinants of bank and sovereign CDS spreads show that these two time series of 
CDS spreads are driven by the same risk factors. Annaert et al. (2013) and Fontana and Scheicher (2010) 
analyse the determinants of Euro area bank CDS spread changes and sovereign CDS spread changes, 
respectively. Both studies are inspired by the theoretical credit risk models, introduced by the seminal 
work of Merton (1974), in the selection of the possible determinants of CDS spreads. Following Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009), which focussed on the determinants of credit spread 
changes for corporates, Annaert et al. (2013) use both firm-specific variables (such as bank financial 
leverage, asset volatility and liquidity) and market-wide variables (such as the risk free interest rate, the 
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slope of the yield curve, a stock index return, an implied volatility index, corporate bond risk premium) to 
explain the changes of bank CDS spreads. Likewise, Fontana and Scheicher (2010) use a very similar set 
of independent variables to explain sovereign CDS spread changes.  
Based on this evidence, the evolution of bank and sovereign CDS spreads should be driven by the same 
common factor at any point in time. Indeed, some other recent studies on the determinants of sovereign 
CDS spreads have investigated whether this common factor is related to fundamental macroeconomic risk 
or to financial risk. For instance, Longstaff et al. (2011) find that most of the sovereign CDS spread 
variation can be explained by US equity, volatility and bond market risk premia. In another study, Ang 
and Longstaff (2011) find evidence that a systemic common factor drives CDS spreads written on 
sovereign states in the US and European countries. They also show that this systemic risk factor is 
affected by global financial factors rather than macroeconomic factors. 
Over the last decade, several papers have analysed the price discovery of corporate credit spreads. For 
instance, Zhu (2004) and Blanco et al. (2005) find that CDS spreads have a greater price discovery role 
than bond credit spreads. Longstaff et al. (2003), Norden and Weber (2009) and Forte and Peña (2009) 
also show that equity-implied spreads and CDS spreads have a leading role over bond credit spreads. 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) show that the CDS market leads the equity market. More recently, there has 
been a proliferation of studies on the price discovery of European sovereign CDS and bond spreads. 
Varga (2009) and Palladini and Portes (2011) find a leading role of sovereign CDS spreads over bond 
spreads. Delatte et al. (2012), O’Kane (2012), Arce et al. (2011), Fontana and Scheicher (2010) find that 
CDS spreads lead in some countries, whereas bond credit spreads lead in others.  
Following a similar methodology to these price discovery studies, our paper aims to analyse the price 
discovery of bank and sovereign CDS spreads to the revelation of the common factor (or efficient price) 
which previous research has identified as the main driver of the two series of CDS spreads. Our decision 
to focus on CDS spreads rather than bond credit spreads derives from a greater evidence of a leading role 
of CDS spreads for both corporates and sovereigns. 
More recently, academics, regulators and policymakers have focussed on the need to find more effective 
and less costly resolution mechanisms for banks in financial distress. The main goal of a successful 
resolution policy is to achieve the necessary rebuilding of banks’ balance sheets at the lowest costs (in 
terms of taxpayers’ transfer of wealth) and the worsening of incentives in the financial system. A great 
deal of attention has been given to the concept of “contingent capital”. Contingent capital allows banks to 
issue debt claims which convert to equity during crisis periods, generating capital buffers at times when it 
is paramount and hard for banks to raise new capital. Previous studies which have suggested the use of 
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contingent capital are by Flannery (2009), Squam Lake Working Group (2010), Pennacchi et al. (2010), 
McDonald (2013), Hart and Zingales (2011) and Sundaresan and Wang (2013).  
Flannery (2009) suggests that systemically important banks issue contingent capital certificates (CCC). 
When asset values fall significantly, some of the CCC would be converted into equity to restore capital to 
a target level. Squam Lake Working Group (2010) proposes a dual trigger for conversion. In particular, a 
declaration by the regulators that there is a systemic crisis (regulatory trigger) and violations of covenants 
indicated in the debt claim (accounting trigger) would determine debt conversion into equity. Pennacchi 
et al. (2011) introduce the Call Option Enhanced Reverse Convertible (COERC). When a market value 
trigger is reached, debt is converted into equity at a deep discount and shareholders have the right to 
purchase the shares at the conversion price. McDonald (2013) also proposes a dual trigger which converts 
debt into equity when both the bank’s stock price and the value of a financial institution’s index reach a 
trigger value. Sundaresan and Wang (2013) perform a theoretical analysis on the design of contingent 
capital with a market trigger based on equity prices. They show that, if used as a regulatory tool, 
contingent capital with market triggers can be problematic. In particular, at the time of conversion, the 
existence of multiple equilibria can lead to potential manipulation of equity prices when the latter 
approach the trigger levels. Contrary to previous studies, which used equity prices as triggers, Hart and 
Zingales (2011) suggest the use of CDS spreads as market triggers to decide when debt claims have to be 
converted into equity.  
 
3. Data 
We download sovereign CDS and bank CDS daily mid-quotes from CMA (provided by Datastream) for 
six major European economies, namely France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Spain. CMA data 
from Datastream are available from January 2004 until September 2010. Starting from October 2010 until 
March 2013, Datastream provides CDS quotes obtained from Thomson Reuters.
2
 In accordance with 
previous studies, we focus on the 5-year maturity for senior unsecured debt, as these contracts are 
regarded as the most liquid in the market. The time series of bank CDS spreads for each country was 
created by averaging individual bank CDS spreads at the country level.  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the time series of CDS spreads both for the six countries and on aggregate, 
respectively, over the whole sample period from January 2004 until March 2013. It is evident how the 
level of both bank and sovereign CDS spreads started to rise dramatically since mid-2007, in 
                                                          
2
 CDS spreads for Sweden and Spain are only available starting from March 2004 and July 2004, respectively.  
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correspondence with the outbreak of the financial crisis. Clearly, the pair of spreads for each country are 
very much interlinked over the whole sample period. We compute Pearson’s correlations (unreported) at 
the country level and find that they range from about 0.90 to 0.98. However, the correlation between 
sovereign and bank CDS spreads is 0.66 in Sweden, and an explanation for this lower value could derive 
from the higher illiquidity of the sovereign CDS market in the early part of the sample.    
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the levels of bank CDS spreads (Panel A) and sovereign CDS 
spreads (Panel B). We can note how bank CDS spreads show a higher mean and volatility than sovereign 
CDS spreads. Median values are consistently lower than mean values, highlighting the presence of non-
normality features such as positive skewness. The range of values for the bank and sovereign CDS 
spreads is very wide and this is reflected by the fact that the first part of our sample coincides with a very 
tranquil period, whereas the second part includes both the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. As can be seen from the last row of the two panels, aggregate results show a similar 
picture to the country-level summary statistics. With regard to the bank CDS spreads, we have an overall 
sample of 28 banks spread across the six countries. The minimum number of banks is found in Portugal 
(only 2), whereas the maximum number of banks is in Italy and Spain (7 banks for each country). 
According to the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test
3
, both bank and sovereign CDS spreads are non-
stationary at the 5% significance level for France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The sovereign 
CDS spreads for Sweden are non-stationary at the 10% significance level. Instead, CDS changes result to 
be stationary.  
 
4. Methodology 
The first step of our analysis is to check whether bank and sovereign CDS spreads are cointegrated at the 
country-level. Two non-stationary variables are cointegrated if there exists a linear combination of them 
which is stationary. In this case, both variables share the same stochastic trend. The literature review and 
the evidence found in section 2 hint at the existence of a long-run relationship between the two variables 
under investigation, as they both are driven by the same risk drivers and graphically share common 
patterns over the whole sample period. 
In order to test for cointegration, we implement the Johansen (1991) test for each country’s pair of 
sovereign and bank CDS spreads. Indeed, as discussed in the next section, cointegration is found for all 
                                                          
3
 See Dickey and Fuller (1981). Results on the ADF test are available on request. 
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six countries. This finding is very important for the choice of the appropriate econometric model to be 
used to describe the time series behaviour of the bank and sovereign CDS spreads. In particular, the 
following analysis is based on the vector error correction model (VECM). The latter model is best suited 
to represent the dynamic interactions of cointegrated variables. Our general model is applied separately 
for each country and is given below:             
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where     and     are i.i.d. error terms.  We define the cointegrating equation as follows: 
1101   tt SovereignBankCE          (3) 
Bank and Sovereign represent bank CDS mid-quote and sovereign CDS mid-quote, respectively. This 
general representation allows us to investigate the price discovery process between bank and sovereign 
CDS spreads. In order to do so, we study the statistical significance of the error correction coefficients, 
namely λ1 and λ2. For example, for the bank CDS spreads to be leading the price discovery process λ2 has 
to be positive and statistically significant and, at the same time, λ1 has to be statistically insignificant. This 
would mean that sovereign CDS spreads have to adjust when they deviate from bank CDS spreads in 
order to meet the long-run equilibrium defined in equation (3). As bank CDS spreads would not be 
responsible for the latter adjustment, they would be leading the price discovery process. On the other 
hand, bank CDS spreads would not lead the price discovery if λ1 is negative and statistically significant 
and λ2 is not statistically different from zero. If both λ1 and λ2 are correctly signed (as indicated above) 
and statistically significant, then both bank and sovereign CDS spreads would contribute to the price 
discovery process. Another way to quantify which market leads the price discovery is via the 
implementation of common factor models. The latter are used to generate a price discovery measure for 
each market. For our purposes, we use the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure of price discovery. 
According to Gonzalo and Granger (1995), the contribution of bank CDS spreads to the price discovery 
can be defined by the following expression: 
12
2



BankGG           (4)   
9 
 
where BankGG  stands for the Gonzalo and Granger measure for bank CDS spreads. )1( BankGG  would 
define the contribution to the price discovery of sovereign CDS spreads. For instance, a BankGG  value of 
0.80 can be interpreted as evidence that 80% of the price discovery takes place in bank CDS spreads, 
whereas the remaining 20% of price discovery is attributed to sovereign CDS spreads.   
 
5. Results 
The results of the Johansen cointegration test are reported in Table 2. Trace test statistics show that one 
cointegrating equation is found for each of the six countries under analysis. Hence, a long-run relationship 
exists between bank and sovereign CDS spreads in each country. Cointegration is also found on aggregate 
between the mean sovereign CDS spreads and the mean bank CDS spreads.  
Based on this finding, we estimate both a country-level and an aggregate VECM – as defined in equations 
(1) to (3) – which is used to study the price discovery process between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. 
In Table 3, we report the estimated error correction coefficients, their significance and the GG measure of 
price discovery for different sample periods.
4
 Panel A describes results for the whole sample period. If we 
focus our attention on the error correction coefficients, we can note that λ1 is highly significant in 5 out of 
6 cases, whereas λ2 is significant 3 out 6 cases. Hence, there is greater evidence that sovereign CDS 
spreads lead bank CDS spreads than vice versa. This finding is confirmed by the GG values, reported in 
the last column of the table. Indeed, sovereign CDS spreads dominate the price discovery in 4 countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), whereas bank CDS spreads have a leading role in Portugal and 
Sweden only. 
In order to better capture the time variation of the price discovery, we split the sample into 3 sub-periods: 
a pre-crisis period (January 2004 to July 2007), a sub-prime crisis period (August 2007 to December 
2009) and a sovereign debt crisis period (January 2010 to March 2013). The splitting points for the sub-
periods are selected based on the fact that the cost of insurance against corporate defaults doubled in 
August and we take this as a strong signal for the start of the sub-prime crisis. We also choose January 
2010 as the starting point of the sovereign debt crisis as on January, 12
th
 Eurostat reported that Greek debt 
                                                          
4
 In some cases, we find that GG values are lower than zero or higher than 1. We follow Blanco et al. (2005) and 
replace these numbers with zero and one, respectively. 
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data could not be relied upon, causing concerns among financial market participants, of a possible Greek 
default on its foreign borrowing.
5
  
Panel B of Table 3 shows results for the pre-crisis period. We can observe that λ1 is significant in 2 cases 
(for France and Italy), whereas λ2 is highly significant in 5 out of 6 cases. This would suggest a greater 
leading role for bank CDS spreads. The GG measure shows that a clear leading role of bank CDS spreads 
occurs in Germany, Portugal and Sweden, whereas in the other countries sovereign CDS spreads lead the 
price discovery. These findings support the fact that both bank and sovereign CDS spreads have had a 
significant price discovery role in the period preceding the start of the financial crisis. 
Panel C analyses the sub-prime crisis period, for which λ1 is negative and significant for 5 countries out of 
6, while λ2 is positive and significant in the case of Germany only. Hence, we find overwhelming 
evidence of the leading role of sovereign CDS spreads, and this is confirmed also by the values assumed 
by the GG measure, which are close to zero for bank CDS spreads. 
Finally, Panel D summarizes estimation results for the sovereign debt crisis period. Similar to the sub-
prime crisis results, λ1 is negative and significant in 5 cases out of 6, whereas λ2 is never significant at the 
5% significance level. Again, these findings support a leading role of sovereign CDS spreads over bank 
CDS spreads. The latter is also confirmed by the bank GG values which are always lower than 0.50 
except for the case of Portugal (GG of 0.66). 
Overall, our results show that the period preceding the start of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was 
characterized by a joint contribution of both bank and sovereign CDS spreads to the price discovery. 
However, during both the sub-prime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, sovereign CDS spreads have 
taken the lead over bank CDS spreads. 
Our findings relative to the crisis periods (Panel C and D) can be explained by (1) the presence of a 
potential illiquidity premium existing in the CDS market for financial companies, as documented by 
Annaert et al. (2013), according to whom CDS protection sellers raised the ask price in order to balance 
the increased hedging difficulties. Evidence of illiquidity is found for their regression of bank CDS 
spreads on liquidity proxies, whereas Fontana and Scheicher (2010) find that liquidity proxies are 
insignificant to explain changes in sovereign CDS spreads. This finding could hint at the fact that the 
sovereign CDS market was more liquid than the bank CDS market and, hence, preferred by credit 
                                                          
5
 Note that for the estimation of the VECM for the different sub-periods, we impose the cointegration equations 
obtained from the VECM implemented over the whole sample period. 
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traders;
6
 (2) the emergence of counterparty risk in the settlement of CDS contracts during the crisis 
periods may have affected more the CDS market for banks than for sovereigns. This may clearly have 
kept investors from trading bank CDS spreads and favoured sovereign CDS trading;
7
 (3) the existence of 
explicit and implicit guarantees has taken attention away from banks and directed it to sovereigns, which 
took on full responsibility for the survival of a country’s banking system and burdened their public 
finances with excessive debt. Hence, investors willing to bet on bank credit risk have done so by trading 
sovereign CDS spreads as the latter were seen as the main source of banking risk; (4) linked to point (3), 
possible speculative attacks on sovereign CDS markets may have been at play, as evidenced by the 
decisions taken by some European governments which banned naked sovereign CDS positions.
8
 
Interestingly, these decisions do not seem to have affected the price discovery process of sovereign CDS 
spreads, which, except the case of Portugal, lead bank CDS spreads in the period interested by these 
policy actions. The latter finding is in contrast with Duffie (2010), according to whom banning sovereign 
CDS would have negatively affected the public information flow about a borrower’s credit quality. Portes 
(2010) instead expressed positive views on a ban on naked CDS as buying naked sovereign CDS would 
drive up prices and increase a country’s borrowing costs.  
Table 3 also shows average (based on country-level estimates) and aggregate bank GG measures for each 
sample period. While 57% (93% based on aggregate results) of the price discovery occurs in bank CDS 
spreads before the start of the financial crisis, consistent with the theoretical evidence discussed in section 
2, according to which both bank and sovereign CDS spreads are driven by the same fundamental factors 
and hence are both expected to contribute significantly, to a greater or lesser extent, to the price discovery 
of the common factor, only 6% (0% based on aggregate results) of the price discovery is due to bank CDS 
spreads during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The share of bank CDS spreads’ price discovery is equal 
                                                          
6
 We find that bid-ask spreads (often used as a liquidity proxy) are much higher for bank CDS contracts. In 
particular, they are about 1.3 basis points (bp) higher than sovereign CDS contracts in the pre-crisis period, but they 
significantly increase during the sub-prime crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, where they exceed sovereign CDS 
bid-ask spreads by 4.3 bp and 7.4 bp, respectively. 
7
 What is special about bank CDS contracts is the fact that banks may constitute the buyers, the sellers and the 
reference entities of the contract, such that if a credit event occurs (e.g., bank default) there is a high probability that 
other banks (which could be protection sellers) may default as well. This circumstance is especially possible in times 
of distress (such as the recent financial crisis) if banks are highly interconnected (and they were) because of 
financial innovation and globalization, the extensive use of securitization and substantial use of the interbank market 
for funding purposes. Hence, from this point of view, bank CDS contracts bear higher systemic risk than sovereign 
CDS contracts. In the latter, banks still appear as buyers and sellers but the reference entity is a sovereign. The 
failure of a sovereign is less likely to spill over to banks unless several banks hold substantial holdings of 
government debt of the defaulted country. The CDS settlement in case of the Greek default was smooth (see Coudert 
and Gex, 2013) as the Greek debt was not considered as systemic, but the question is whether the sovereign CDS 
market would have functioned as smoothly in case of a German default. 
8
 In May 2010, the German financial regulator banned naked sovereign CDS positions (Augustin, 2012). In the same 
period, similar decisions were taken by the financial regulators of the other European countries. 
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to 18% (0% based on aggregate results) during the sovereign debt crisis period. The massive drop in the 
price discovery of bank CDS spreads that occurred during the financial crisis shows how traders had 
already factored in the credit risk transfer from banks to sovereigns in the period 2007-2009, that is well 
in advance of the actual government bailouts that occurred in May 2011 for Portugal and July 2012 for 
Spain. Very low values of price discovery for bank CDS spreads indicate a sign of inefficiency in the 
price formation of the “true” CDS spreads inherent in bank CDS spreads. In this very moment, it would 
have been necessary for regulators and policymakers to affect the bank CDS market’s expectations in 
order to re-establish markets’ efficiency and efficient capital allocation. In line with Hart and Zingales 
(2011), a price discovery measure (such as the GG measure) could be either used as a new market trigger 
for banks’ contingent capital purposes or to simply signal to the supervisory bodies that banks should 
increase their equity funding. Such a measure could be used both at the country level and at the aggregate 
level. The latter application would be particularly interesting as it would deal with situations (such as the 
current one) where many financial institutions within Europe are in distress at the same time and decrease 
lending to comply with regulation rather than raising new equity, generating recession mechanisms 
(credit crunch). For example, a centralized regulatory body could enforce banks to issue new equity or 
convert debt claims into equity if the average price discovery of European bank CDS spreads was less 
than 5% (and the price discovery of sovereign CDS spreads was more than 95%). At the country level, as 
of March 2013 (Panel D of Table 3), it would be advisable that Spanish, French and German banks 
increase their capital buffers, in order to avoid future costly government bailouts.
9
 
The use of price discovery triggers for contingent capital is particularly interesting, as it could partly deal 
with the concerns of market manipulation raised in the literature on banks’ contingent capital for the use 
of stock prices as market triggers for conversion of debt into equity. As discussed previously in section 2, 
McDonald (2013) suggested the use of a dual price trigger to attenuate these concerns. On the same line 
as McDonald (2013), a feasible alternative could be to base the conversion on both a stock price trigger 
and a price discovery trigger. The latter trigger would make manipulation harder as it would not be 
observable in the market but would require the use of an econometric model such as the VECM.  
  
 
                                                          
9
 We also run the analysis assuming the German sovereign CDS spreads as a benchmark. In fact, German 
government bonds have been a target investment among investors all over Europe during the recent years as they 
were regarded as the safest market for government bonds. Hence, German sovereign CDS spreads and bank CDS 
spreads for each of the six countries are used for the VECM analysis in equations (1)-(3). Results (available on 
request) are very similar to those presented in Table 3. However, we do not find cointegration between the German 
sovereign CDS spreads and the Italian bank CDS spreads. 
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6. Conclusions 
Based on the evidence provided by previous research on the existence of a common factor responsible for 
the time variation of both bank and sovereign CDS spreads, this paper investigates the price discovery 
process to this common factor of bank and sovereign CDS spreads for six major European economies 
during the 2004-2013 period. 
Our results show substantial evidence of the leading role of sovereign CDS spreads over bank CDS 
spreads during the sub-prime crisis and the successive sovereign debt crisis. This finding can partly be 
motivated by the credit risk transfer from the banking sector to the sovereigns that occurred in the 
European countries either through bank bailouts or implicit guarantees provided by the European 
governments. This credit risk transfer was anticipated by credit traders in 2009, as shown by the 
overwhelming and striking price discovery dominance of sovereign CDS spreads over bank CDS spreads. 
Additional explanations of these findings stem from greater illiquidity concerns and counterparty risk 
inherent in bank CDS contracts.  
Our conclusions support the idea that bank and sovereign CDS markets have been interconnected since 
the start of their CDS trading and that sovereign CDS spreads should be considered by both bank 
regulators and monetary authorities to provide early signals on the default risk of a country’s banking 
system. Furthermore, price discovery information could be used to generate market triggers for banks’ 
contingent capital. Our results show that price discovery signals would have triggered an early 
intervention to bolster banks’ capital buffers in 2009. This would have favoured the option of banks’ 
restructuring to the more costly one of a government bailout. 
Banks’ recapitalization, at times when investors believe that, according to the price discovery 
mechanisms, banks are more likely to be bailed out by governments, would be beneficial for banks 
themselves as they would be seen as less risky, much safer and more able to face the occurrence of credit 
events and ensure an orderly and successful settlement of CDS contracts. Higher levels of capital for 
banks would improve the trading activity, liquidity and efficiency of the bank CDS market and reduce the 
concerns on banks’ counterparty risk. In turn, this should increase the price discovery for bank CDS 
spreads relative to sovereign CDS spreads and, hence, rebalance the share of price discovery of both bank 
and sovereign CDS markets to their common factor. At last, higher levels of bank capital could bring 
huge benefits to the society as a whole because the likelihood of government bailouts would be reduced 
and financial resources could be allocated more efficiently to sustain a country’s economic growth.           
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
This table reports, for each country, summary statistics (expressed in basis points) for the time series of 
bank CDS spreads (Panel A) and sovereign CDS spreads (Panel B) over the whole sample period, which 
starts from January 2004 until March 2013.  
 N. Banks Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Deviation 
Panel A: Summary statistics for bank CDS spreads 
France 5 94.10 88.37 5.88 366.3 89.46 
Germany 3 87.44 76.75 7.88 364.3 79.52 
Italy 7 140.8 71.39 8.33 691.8 167.7 
Portugal 2 282.1 95.76 8.43 1485 382.3 
Sweden 4 70.69 70.34 8.25 238.7 54.78 
Spain 7 150.9 106.9 5.39 644.4 149.2 
ALL 28 135.9 97.11 8.18 549.8 139.4 
Panel B: Summary statistics for sovereign CDS spreads 
France - 49.06 14.75 1.50 249.6 61.04 
Germany - 27.05 9.50 0.60 119.2 29.56 
Italy - 123.6 43.85 5.30 591.5 150.7 
Portugal - 240.0 40.50 1.90 1527 357.5 
Sweden - 33.34 29.52 1.40 160.8 29.46 
Spain - 134.4 65.77 2.55 641.0 159.8 
ALL - 99.11 26.09 3.29 457.4 125.3 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Johansen Cointegration Test 
This table reports Johansen trace test statistics for the existence of a cointegrating vector relating bank 
CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads. A constant is included in both the cointegrating equation and 
the VAR. The number of lags is optimized according to the Akaike criterion. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 Number of Cointegrating Equations 
 None At Most 1 
France 17.44** 2.52 
Germany 24.09*** 2.93* 
Italy 38.52*** 2.00 
Portugal 20.60*** 1.20 
Sweden 53.47*** 3.09* 
Spain 37.18*** 2.63 
Aggregate 29.60*** 2.46 
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Table 3 – Price Discovery Contributions 
Error correction coefficients (λi) estimates, their t-statistic and the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) measure 
of price discovery are reported for the whole sample period (Panel A), the pre-crisis period (Panel B), the 
sub-prime crisis period (Panel C) and the sovereign debt crisis period (Panel D).  
 λ1 t-stat λ2 t-stat GGBank 
Panel A: Whole Sample (January 2004 – March 2013) 
Aggregate -0.02 -4.72 -0.00 -0.23 0.00 
France -0.01 -3.35 -0.00 -0.41 0.00 
Germany -0.01 -3.69 0.00 0.39 0.03 
Italy -0.01 -4.10 0.00 0.51 0.13 
Portugal -0.01 -1.84 0.01 2.63 0.63 
Sweden -0.00 -2.44 0.02 6.50 0.86 
Spain -0.03 -5.89 -0.00 -1.34 0.00 
Mean     0.28 
Panel B: Pre-crisis period (January 2004 – July 2007) 
Aggregate -0.01 -1.56 0.11 6.28 0.93 
France 0.02 2.71 0.01 2.59 0.00 
Germany 0.00 0.11 0.02 4.07 1.00 
Italy -0.05 -4.20 0.01 2.48 0.12 
Portugal 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.23 1.00 
Sweden -0.00 -0.43 0.08 7.94 1.00 
Spain -0.05 -1.51 0.02 3.77 0.30 
Mean     0.57 
Panel C: Sub-prime crisis period (August 2007 – December 2009) 
Aggregate -0.03 -3.37 -0.00 -1.02 0.00 
France -0.03 -3.04 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 
Germany -0.01 -1.82 0.00 0.46 0.00 
Italy -0.01 -2.04 -0.00 -0.23 0.00 
Portugal -0.02 -2.98 -0.01 -1.11 0.00 
Sweden -0.00 -1.43 0.00 1.34 0.37 
Spain -0.03 -2.72 -0.00 -0.71 0.00 
Mean     0.06 
Panel D: Sovereign debt crisis period (January 2010 – March 2013) 
Aggregate -0.02 -3.02 -0.00 -0.12 0.00 
France -0.03 -2.91 -0.01 -0.73 0.00 
Germany -0.02 -2.72 -0.00 -0.11 0.00 
Italy -0.02 -2.33 0.00 0.44 0.20 
Portugal -0.00 -1.02 0.01 1.61 0.66 
Sweden -0.01 -2.57 0.00 1.71 0.22 
Spain -0.04 -4.60 -0.01 -1.16 0.00 
Mean     0.18 
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Figure 1 – Time series of bank and sovereign CDS spreads 
This figure shows the evolution of the time series of bank and sovereign CDS spreads (in basis points) for 
the six European economies under analysis, namely France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and Spain. 
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Figure 2 – Time series of average bank and sovereign CDS spreads across the six European economies 
This figure shows the evolution of the time series of average bank and sovereign CDS spreads (in basis 
points). Data from the six European economies have been aggregated. 
 
 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0
1
/0
4
0
5
/0
4
0
9
/0
4
0
1
/0
5
0
5
/0
5
0
9
/0
5
0
1
/0
6
0
5
/0
6
0
9
/0
6
0
1
/0
7
0
5
/0
7
0
9
/0
7
0
1
/0
8
0
5
/0
8
0
9
/0
8
0
1
/0
9
0
5
/0
9
0
9
/0
9
0
1
/1
0
0
5
/1
0
0
9
/1
0
0
1
/1
1
0
5
/1
1
0
9
/1
1
0
1
/1
2
0
5
/1
2
0
9
/1
2
0
1
/1
3
Aggregate EU 
mean_sovereign_cds_spread mean_bank_cds_spread
